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In the SupreDie Court
of the State of Utah
DWIGHT L. KING. Administrator of the
Estate of GER~~LD DALLAS
THOMAS, deceased,
Pla\intiff ,and
Respondent,
No. 7221
Case

vs.
THE DENYER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD CO~IP ANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and
Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in the brief of
appellant accurately describes the physical objects and
conditions existing at the place where Gerald Dallas
Thomas, plaintiff's decedent, was killed. However, the
statement of facts leaves a number of things unstated
and to give a complete picture of the occurrences of Oetober 11, 1947, the day on which decedent was killed, we
believe it necessary to give a few more details.
Thomas had worked only six days on this particular
job and while the conductor Barnes had worked on previous occasions at this particular place and on this job
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he had on this occasion only been there the same length
of time as Thomas (R. 186).
Shortly before the occurrence of Thomas' death it
had been determined by Barnes, who was the conductor
and in charge of the switching crew (R. 143), that two
cars located on the load track north of the bin track were
to be taken out to the bin and there spotted in order
that the coal might be placed in the bin (R. 163). There
were two possible ways in which this spotting could be
accomplished. The first way was to shove the coal cars
out to the bin by the use of the engine (R. 147). In
performing this operation the air brake system would
have been connected and brakes under all of the cars
would be in use as well as the propelling force of the
engine (R. 149, 247, 248, 24,9). 'The second method was
to drop the cars down to the bin by force of gravity and
the brakeman necessarily riding the car would have to
use the hand brake to stop the cars at the proper spot
on the bin (R.149).
Barnes had determined to accomplish this task by
the use of the engine with its more adequate braking
system and the propelling force of the engine. He determined upon this m-ethod because of the fact that "Qoth
Thomas and Schauster had never performed the operation by the use of gravity and the hand brake in spotting cars in the right place on the bin (R. 166, 167) .
.At the time the train crew started 'to perform the
task of placing these cars upon the bin, thirteen cars
the load
track
of provided
the switch
from
were
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that track to the bin track (R. 153, 160). Immediately
north of this bin switch on the load track were seven
cars coupled together. Then to the north of them was
a space and six cars coupled together (R. 153). The
middle two cars of this cut of six cars were destined for
the bin. The first operation which was necessary was
the removal of the cut of seven cars and also the
south two cars of the cut of six cars. The engine was
to the south of the cut of seven cars headed up the canyon, which "\vould be toward the north. For some unexplained reason the engineer, after coupling on to the
cut of seven cars, did not effect a coupling between the
seven car and six car cuts but instead immediately started
the engine south on the load track pulling the cut of
seven cars south on that track to the crossover, shown
on Exhibit "A", which leads over the main line track
and onto the storage tracks (R. 160, 161). After successfully pulling these seven cars onto the storage track,
the engine was derailed (R. 162). Shortly thereafter
Brown, the station agent for the defendant company, appeared on the scene and informed Barnes that unless the
cars with the coal were placed on the bin track right away
that it would be necessary for the coke ovens to cease
their operation because of a lack of coal (R. 164, 165).
After the coal was placed in the bin it was loaded into
small cars and carried to the coke overis.
Brown requested that the two cars be dropped and
spotted on the bin without waiting for the engine to be
placed again in service (R. 165, 188, 189). While Barnes
testified that this was not an unusual method of accompSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lishing this task (R. 182, 183), nevertheless, it was not
the manner in which he had been accustomed to placing
the cars on the bin ( R. 184). In fact Barnes had never
seen anyone besides a brakeman by the name of Burke
take cars out in this manner (R. 188). Burke had been
on this particular job for four or five years (R. 187).
Pursuant to this request of the station agent Barnes
decided to spot the coal cars on the bin in the second
way described above.
To accomplish this task the six cars were then
dropped to within a few feet north of the bin switch.
Four persons, consisting of Barnes, Schauster and two
car droppers, performed this work (R. 163). The two
rear brakes were left dragging and the four men apparently operated the other four brakes (R. 164).
Thomas and Schauster, after uncoupling the two cars
on the south, dropped them onto the storage track. They
then returned to the cars which were to he placed on the
bin (R. 1'67). These two cars were loaded with coal and
weighed between one hundred and one hundred and three
tons each (R. 151, 152). Thomas, who had never before
accomplished this operation (R. 167), climbed onto the
brake platform on the south end of the south car.
Schauster uncoupled the two cars from the other two
which were standing on the track and released the brake
on the second car which then placed the two cars in
readiness for their trip to the bin, some 3000 feet to the
south (R. 244).
From the testimony it appears that in accomplishing
operation
the momentum
ofby the
the
cars
is obtained
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in the first fiYe or six hundred feet, and that from that
point on the speed of the cars is comparatively regular
all the way out (R. 1-!~l, 150). The momentum of the
cars cannot be lost at any point until the cars are brought
to a stop in the right place on the bin. This is because
the track after the first steep grade has been passed is
comparatively level and if the momentum is permitted
to stop at any other place it would be necessary for an
engine to be brought down on the bin track to complete
the trip to the bin (R. 188).
Thomas released the brake and the cars started on
their way (R. 244). Until the cars arrived at the approach to the bin no one observed Thomas or his activities, except the defendant's witness, Arnett W. Dodds,
who saw him for part of the way down, from a point
marked "D" to about a point marked "D-4" on Exhibit
"A" (R. 312, 315, 316). At this time Thomas was standing on the brake platform. He had hold of 'the brake
wheel, with his body and his feet planted toward the
car, and his head turned to the south in the direction the
cars were proceeding (R. 319). The speed of the cars
was variously estimated by the witnesses. The jury could
have found from the testimony that at the end of the
steep grade the cars were moving about thirty-five miles
per hour (R. 291) and that at the time they arrived at
the bin they were moving approximately four miles per
hour (R. 194).
The defendant called as its witness, Silas Ross (R.
287). Ross was stationed in what is known as the scale
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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house located from 75 to 80 yards south of the bin (R.
289). Before the two coal cars had commenced their
trip to the bin he had become concerned about the necessity of closing down the operation of the coke ovens if
the coal was not delivered to the bin (R. 300). As a
result he kept looking out of ,a window in the scale house
toward the 'load track where the cars were then stationed.
He observed the cars leave the load track and start on
their journey '(R. 290). He saw them for fleeting moments on this journey but was unable to observe Thomas
on the front brake platform until the cars reached the
approach to the bin at a point marked R-4 on Exhibit
"A" (R. 290-293). At this time Thomas was standing on
the brake platform with his body facing toward the car
and his head turned· facing in the direction he was going (R. 293, 294).
Defendant in its brief states that Thomas had not
applied "any brake." It is obvious that the witness Ross
could not testify whether or not the brake had been applied up to this point. This was the first time that he
was able to see the brakeman and what had occurred
previous to this time he could not state. The jury could
well have come to the conclusion that even at this point
Ross was unable to determine whether or not 'Thomas
was making an application of the brake. The uncertainty
of his testimony on this subject is indicated by the following quoted portions of the record (R. 293):

"Q. And at that time did you see the brakeman
on the head of these cars 1
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

\Yhat, if anything, was he doing with reference to the brakes ¥

A. He was standing on the platform. He hadn't
applied anything, he hadn't applied any
brake, or anything.
Q.

:\IR. RA\\TLINGS: I ask that that be stricken
as his conclusion.

THE COURT: I think all he intends to convey
now is the times when he saw them. I don't
suppose he is talking about times when he
didn't see them. What is it, an objection or
motion¥
MR. RAWLINGS:
THE COURT:
Q.

We had a motion.

The motion will be denied.

Now, on these previous points that you saw
these cars, did you see the brakeman at that
time¥

A. I noticed him in about this position first.
Q.

What, if anything was he doing at that

A.

He was standing on the platform.

time~

Q. Was he doing anything to the brakes¥
A.

No, sir.

•••

Q. Which direction was he facing~
A. Facing towards the bins. (R. 294)
Q.

Could you see whether or nO't he had his hwnd
on the b;rake?

A.

No, sir, that is to10 far OJWay.
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Q. When you saw him at this last point you have
mentioned, could you see whether or not he
had his hand on the brake at that time~
A.

Q.
A.

Yes, he had it in the prescribed way.
***
What, if a;nything, wa-s he doing with the
brake, so far as you could see?
So far ,as I could see he was sta;nding in the
prescribed position.

Q. And that is facing
A.

outward~

It would be facing eastward.

Q. In the direction the car was going~
A.

Yes, he had his head turned that way. His
body was turned that way.''

It is submitted that from the foregoing testimony the
jury could find that Thomas was standing in the prescribed way for application of the brake but that Ro~s
was too far away to say that he was not making an application of the brake. Defendant's statement that the
evidence or testimony supports his statement that there
had been no application of the brake to this point is
directly contrary to the testimony of Ross, who on crossexamination stated : "I don't know whether he had ap•
plied the brakes or not.'' (R. 304)
Ross further testified that the bin then obscured
his view and that he did not again see Thomas until he
arrived at the sign saying "Danger. Cars not 'to be
dropped beyond this point.'' This sign is approximately
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Thon1as was traveling through this space Ross could not
say whether or not Thomas ·had been making a vigorous
application of the brake. He so testified (R. 306):

"Q. You don't know whether he had been working on the brake vigorously, or not, up to that
ti1ne, do you~
A. No, sir."
Ross then testified that Thomas appeared to glance
at the danger sign and then make a vigorous application
of the brake (R. 295). Thomas then attempted to either
step down on the coupling or jump off to the side (R.
307). It is interesting to note that Ross testified that
the cars did not in any way slow down after this vigorous
application of the brake.

'' Q. When you saw the cars subsequently was
there any change in the speed~
A. No, they seemed to stay at the relative
speed.'' ( R. 296)
In meeting the contentions and points raised by the
defendant, we will treat the evidence more in detail hereafter but with the foregoing additions and with the exception of the evidence relating to the negligence in maintaining the bumper device and that relating to damages
the statement of facts contained in the brief of appellant
is satisfactory.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IF THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR
THE NEGLIGENCE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY,
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE CANNOT BE SUSTAINED.
POINT II.
THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE HAND
BRAKE ON THE CAR RIDDEN BY PLAINTIFF'S
DECEDENT WAS NOT AN EFFICIENT HAND
BRAKE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SAFETY
APPLIANCE ACT.
POINT III.
THERE WAS: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
JUSTIFY SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE
ISSUES OF THE INSECURITY OF THE COAL BIN
AND THE DANGEROUS AND HAZARDOUS SITUATION EXISTING AS A RESULT OF SUCH INSECURITY.
POINT IV.
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT WERE
NOT REPETITIOUS, DID NOT UNDULY EMPHASIZE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE CASE AND
WERE NOT UNBALANCED TO THE PREJUDICE
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POINTY.
THE TR.I~-\.L COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER.ROR
IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 7 AND 8.
POINT \TI.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE ESTABLISHED AS :JL-\.TTER OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT W~-\.S NEGLIGENT AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S
DECEDEXT THO:JIAS \VAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE ANY ERRORS REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS RELATING
TO LIABILITY DO NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL OR REVERSIBLE ERROR.
POINT VII.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROPERLY RAISED
THE OBJECTION IT NOW ASSERTS TO THE
TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS
MATTER OF LAW ON THE QUESTION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
POINT VIII.
DEFENDANT HAS NO RIGHT TO SET OFF
ANNUITIES PAYABLE UNDER THE RAILROAD
RETIREMENT ACT.
POINT IX.
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE AND THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO ORDER A REDUCTION IN THE
AMOUNT
OR A NEW TRIAL.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IF THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR
THE NEGLIGENCE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY,
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE CANNOT BE SUSTAINED.
It is to be noted that defendant does not assert that
the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the
verdict rendered. It does not contend that its motion for
a directed verdict should have been granted.
It should need no argument to sustain the propo~
sition that the rules laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States regarding insufficient evidence is
applicable to the grounds upon which defendant seeks a
reversal of the judgment in this case. In other words,
if there is an evidentiary basis to support the finding
of an inefficient hand brake plaintiff's first contention
cannot be sustained. To sustain that point there must be
"a complete absence of probative facts to support" such
finding. This is also true as to defendant's second point
concerning the bumper device.
The rules laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States relating to insufficiency of the evidence
are universally recognized as very liberal rules in favor
of the verdict rendered by the jury. Perhaps the best
example of this liberality is found in the case of Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 744 (1946).
That
was
anLawaction
brought
under
F.E.L.A.
toLibrary
re-Services
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cover for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent. The
evidence there showed that the deceased opened a switch
to permit a train to back into the station, that it was his
duty then to cross the track before the train passed the
switch and he ·was seen to so cross. There was evidence
that it was his duty to wait at the switch on that side of
the track until the train had cleared, then close the switch,
return to his shanty near the crossing and change the
signals from red to green. The evidence further showed
that the train passed along the track at the rate of eight
or ten miles per hour. The switch, however, was not
closed and the. signals were not changed after it passed.
Upon investigation deceased was found near the switch
lying face downward on the ground unconscious. He was
dead upon arrival at the hospital. He had been struck
in the back of the head causing a fractured skull. There
were no known eyewitnesses to the fatal blow. There
was evidence that on the side of the train where deceased was found a mail hook hung down loosely on the
outside of the mail car. This end was 73 inches above
the top of the rail, which was 7 inches high. The overhang of the mail car in relation to the rails was about
two to two and one-half feet. The evidence indicated
that when the mail car swayed or moved around a curve
the mail hook might pivot causing the end to swing out
as much as twelve to fifteen inches. 'This end could be
swung out to a point three to three and a half feet from
the rail. On both sides of the track were uneven mounds
of cinders and dirt rising at its highest points 18 to 24
inches above the tops of the rails. Witnesses differed as
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to how close these mounds were to the rails but estimates
ran from three to fifteen feet. If this mail hook swung
out it would be from 49 to 55 inches above the highest
parts of the mounds. Deceased was 67lf2 inches tall.
His wound was about four inches below the top of his
head or 63lf2 inches above the point where he stood on
the ground, the Supreme Court remarking: "Well within
the possible range of the mail hook end.'' Based upon
this evidence the Supreme Court held that a finding of
negligence could be supported requiring the finding that
the mail hook came in contact with deceased's head. The
lower court stated that "All reasonable minds would
agree that it would be mere speculation and conjecture
to say that Haney was struck by the mail hook." The
Supreme Court of the United States~ however, held that
it could not be said that such finding was unsupported
by probative facts or to be so unreasonable as to warrant
taking the case from the jury. The Supreme Court conceded that it was true that there was evidence tending
to show that it was physically and mathematically impossible for the hook to strike Haney and that there were
facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that
deceased was murdered. However, the Court stated :

'' * * * But such evidence has become irrelevant upon appeal, there being a reasonable
basis in the record for inferring that the hook
struck Haney. The jury having made that inference, the respondents were not free to relitigate the factual dispute in a reviewing court.
Under these circumstances it would be an undue
Sponsored by the S.J.invasion
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appellate rourt to weigh the conflicting evidence,
judge the credibility of witnesses and arrive at
a conclusion opposite from the one reached by
the jury. * * *
''It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. WheneYer facts are in dispute or the evidence is such
that fairminded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is
required on the part of those whose duty it is
to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to
them to be the most reasonable inference. Only
when there is a oomplete ~abs1ence of !probative
facts to support the oonclusion reached does a
reversible err:or appear. But where, as here,
there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion.
And the appellate court's function is exhausted
when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it
being immaterial that the court might draw a
contrary inference or feel that another conclusion
is more reasonable.''
Defendant's contentions with relation to the insufficiency of the evidence to support findings on the
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support
such findings constitute a contention that plaintiff was
not entitled to a jury trial of those issues. We again
quote from the Supreme Court of the United States to
show the liberality of the rules laid down by that court
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in supporting jury findings. In Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L. Ed.
1444, the Court stated:
''The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal
jurisprudence.' Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S.
752, 62 S. Ct. 854, 86 L. Ed. 1166. It is part
and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under the Employers' Liability Act. Re·aso"YYr
able care and oause and effect are as elusive here
.as in other fields. But the jury has been chosen
as the appropriate tribunal to apply those standards to the facts of these personal injuries. That
method of determining the liability of the carriers and of placing on them the cost of these
industrial accidents may be crude, archaic, and
expensive as compared with the more modern
systems of workmen's compensation. But however inefficient and backward it may be, it is
the system which Congress has provided. To
deprive these workers of the benefit ·of .a jury
trial in close or doubtful Clases is to take away a
goodly portion of the relief which Congress has
afforded them.''
In Tiller v. AtZant~c Co·ast Line R. Oo., 318 U. S. 54,
63 S. Ct. 444, 451, 87 L. Ed. 610, it is stated:

'' * * * Many years ago this Court said of the
problems of negligence, 'We see no reason, so
long as the jury system is the law of the land, and
the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed
questions of fact, why it should not decide such
questions as these as well as others.' Jones v.
East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 128 U. S. 443, 445,
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on another occasion, •"\Vhere the facts are in dispute, and the eYidence in relation to them is that
fron1 which fair-minded 1nen may draw different
inferences,· the case should go to the jury. * * *
"It appears to be the clear Congressional intent that to the maximum extent proper, questions in actions arising under the Act should be
left to the jury."
We will hereafter demonstrate that the evidence
introduced in this case supports the findings of negligence upon the grounds submitted to the jury within the
rules laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
POINT II.
THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE HAND
BRAKE ON THE CAR RIDDEN BY PLAINTIFF'S
DECEDENT WAS NOT AN EFFICIENT HAND
BRAKE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SAFETY
APPLIANCE ACT.
The most recent case before the Supreme Court of
the United States construing the hand brake provision
of the Safety Ap,pli(})'nce Act ( 45 U.S..C.A., Section 11)
is the case of Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 67 S.
Ct. 1334, 1336, 1338. That Act provides:

" '* * * it shall be unlawful for any common
carrier subject to the provisions of this Act (of
April 14, 1910) to haul, or permit to be hauled or
used on its line, any car subject to the provisions
of this Act not equipped with appliances provided
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for in this act, to wit: All cars must be equipped
with secure sill steps and efficient lvatJUl brakes;
all cars requiring secure ladders and secure running boards shall be equipped with such ladders
and running boards, and all cars having ladders
shall also be equipped with secure hand holds or
grab irons on their roofs at the tops of such ladders : ~ * * '.''
After reviewing cases under the Safety Appliance
Act the Court in the Myers case stated:
"This simplifies the issue beyond that presented in the ordinary case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act where the plaintiff must
establish the negligence of his employer. Here it
is not necessary to find negligence. A railroad
subject to the Safety Appliance Acts may be
found liable if the jury reasonably can infer from
the evidence merely that the hand brake which
caused the injuries was on a car which the railroad was then using on its line, in interstate commerce, and that the brake was not an 'efficient'
hand brake. Furthermore-' There are two recognized methods of showing the inefficiency of hand
brake equipment. Evidence may be adduced to
establish some particular defect, or the same inefficiency may be established by showing a failure
to function, when operated with due care, in the
normal, natural and usual manner.' Didinger
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 39 F. 2d 798, 799."
The Myers case also recognizes the rule that '' Onl!y
whern there is a complet~e absence of pr<olbat'iv,e fac'ts 1~o
support the conclusion reached do,es a reversible error
appear.''
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\Y e submit that it cannot be said there is a complete absence of such probative facts in the case at bar.
\Y e further submit that the testimony here presents an
evidentiary basis that the inefficiency was established
by showing a failure to function when operated with due
care in the normal, natural and usual manner.
At every point at which Thomas was o·bserved by
anyone he was standing in the ''prescribed'' place and
was in the ·'prescribed" position for the operation of
this brake. When he mounted the car before its journey
to the bin he climbed upon the brake platform and was
in position to use the brake (R. 244). When he was
seen by Dodds between points '' D'' and '' D-4'' on Exhibit ''A'' he was riding on the brake platform with his
feet and body planted toward the car and his head turned
facing in the direction of the bin. He had hold of the
brake wheel (R. 319). During this period of time the
witness Dodds could not say definitely whether there was
any difference in the speed of the cut of cars from the
time he first saw them until he last saw them but he did
say "They were running along steadily" (R. 317). He
estimated the speed of the cars at thirty miles per hour
(R. 320). When Ross first saw him he was leaning over
the brake ( R. 306).
At point R-2 on Exhibit "A" the defendant's witness Ross estimated the speed of the cars to be between
25 and 35 miles per hour (R. 291). These two points,
D-4 and R-2, are approximately three to four hundred
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feet south of the point where the grade levels off. (See
Exhibit "A").
It is to he noted that the witness Barnes testified:
''The speed is usually attained about the
first five or six hundred feet on the track there,
on a heavy grade. After that the speed is comparatively regular all the way out." (R.149-150).
The witness Barnes testified that when he saw 'the cars
at a point B-1 (marked on Exhibit "A") the cars were
going between eight and ten miles per hour (R. 193, 198).
This point as measured on the map is approximately
1100 feet from the trestle approach to the bin. (Barnes,
however, in his testimony estimated this distance as being four to six hundred feet from the bin, R. 169).
At this time the cars were slowing down and when
they approached the bin they were moving approximately
five or six miles an hour. Barnes estimated their speed
at four miles per hour when they reached the bin (R.
193, 194). When it is considered that the weight of
these cars was between one hundred and one hundred
and three tons apiece and the momentum coming down
the steep grade together with the testimony of Barnes
that if the original speed had been gathered the speed
was regular thereafter probative facts are present which
would indicate that Thomas was making application of
the brakes as he rode along the track from point R-2 to
B-1 (marked on Exhibit" A") and from thence on south
Exhibit
'thatandthere
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is son1e slig-ht grade to the south except for two spaces
of approximately one hundred feet each. The cars were
slowing- down all along- this space and had been brought
to the bin at a speed of four miles per hour.
One piece of sig-nificant evidence showing- that while
the brakes slowed the cars down they would not stop
the cars is the testimony of Ross to the effect tha:t even
after a vigorous application of the brakes there was
no noticeable change in their speed. He testified that
from the time he saw the cars at the danger sign to the
point where he last saw them on the bin, even though
there had been a vigorous application of the brake there
was no reduction in the relative speed of the cars (R.
296).

We submit that from the testimony (1) Thomas
at all times appeared to be in the performance of his
duties, (2) that there was some application of the brakes
in slowing the cars, ( 3) from the fact that the vigorous
application of the brake while the cars were going four
miles per hour made no noticeable difference in their
speed, that an evidentiary basis exists for a finding
that Thomas operated the brakes with due care in the
normal, natural and usual manner, and that they failed
to stop the cars at the spot desired on the bin. Certainly it cannot be said that there is a complete absence of
probative facts to support such finding. There is not
one scintilla of evidence in this case that there was no
application of the brake. Merely because the witness
Ross was willing to say that there had been no applicaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion of brake does not prove that fact. As indicated, he
conceded that he did not know what took place when he
could not see Thomas. There is no testimony in the
record that Thomas would have to make revolutions of
the brake wheel in order to bring about the desired pressure of the brakes on the wheel.
Defendant's own expert indicated that there would
not have to be any great show of physical exertion to
bring about such pressure. At Record 334 he testified:

"Q. What amount of pressure is necessary to
apply this brake wheel in order to put those
shoes against the wheel tight~
A.

It takes very little pressure to start the pressure on the brake shoe on the wheels.''

It is not necessary to use a brake club on this type
of brake, the use of a hand on it is sufficient (R. 168).
At the distances the witnesses were situated from
Thomas, the jury could well have believed that they could
not possibly say there had been no application of the
brake and that Thomas could have been putting the
necessary pressure on the brakes without any show of
physical activity.
We submit that this evidence creates an evidentiary
basis for a finding that Thomas used the brake in the
normal and usual manner but it failed to bring the cars
to a complete stop as it should.
Defendant in its brief has stated that the presumpof due care on the part of deceased may not he contion
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sidered by the jury or the court in determining whether
or not the evidence on this point is suffici~nt. However,
under the facts and circumstances of the case at bar such
presumption may be considered.
In the case of-Worthington v. Elmer, 207 Fed. 306,
308-309, the court considered this presumption of due
care on the part of the deceased person in determining
whether or not the evidence was sufficient. That case
involved the proposition of whether or not the dece·ased
used a brake. The court held that from the circumstances, together with this ·p~esumption of due care,
such a finding could be made and in that connection the
court stated:
"However, it is urged that 'there is no evidence that Rice was using the defective brake.'
He was seen operating the brake of the oil car but
was not seen alive thereafter. The defective
brake of the box car was immediately in front of
him when he was setting the brake of the oil car,
and his lantern stood close to him on the platform. The record is silent as to his movements
between the time of setting the oil car brake and
the collision. It is hard to conceive, in view of
the distance between the point at which he boarded
the car and the location of the standing cars, in
connection with the close proximity of the brake
on the box car, that there was not time for an experienced brakeman both to set the oil car brake
and try to set the other brake. Everything that
he was seen to do was in the prompt performance
of acknowledged duty. Is it to be said, then, that
he failed in so important a matter as at least to
try to use the brake of the box car~ That was the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
very next and the last ste-p to be taken in the discharge of his duty; and his own safety as well as
that of both the moving and standing cars depended upon his performance of that duty.
"It is settled in this court that on the defendant's motion to direct it was the duty of the court
to take the most favorable view of the plaintiff's
evidence (Erie R. R. v. Weber & Kraft, 207 Fed.
293, decided June 3, 1913; Tennessee Copper Co.
v. Nevada Gaddy, 207 Fed. 297, decided on the
same day), 'and from that evidence, and the inferences reasonably and justifiably to be drawn
therefrom, determine whether or not, under the
law, a verdict might be found' for the plaintiff
(Mt. Adams & E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery,
74 Fed. at page 477, 20 C. C. A. 59·6, by the present
Mr. Justice Lurton; see, also, L. & N. R. R. Co. v.
Bell, 206 Fed. 395, decided by this court June 30,
1913).
"From the facts just pointed out and the most
natural and reasonable inference deducible- therefrom, it was entirely justifiable to conclude that
Rice continued in the performance of his duty respecting the brake on the box car between the
time he was seen setting the opposite brake and
the collision. As was said in Maguire v. Fitchburg Railroad, 146 Mass. 379, 15 N.E. 904, respecting the evidential effect of finding a deceased employe's body at a place where his duty
had called him :
'' 'The jury might well have belic-;~ed that
he was on the track in the performance of
his duty and in the exercise of aU the care to
be expected of a prudent man.'
''See, also, Caron v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 164 Mass. 523, 525, 526, 42 N. E. 112.
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"This is in principle like the presumption of
performance of duty, which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is indulged in favor of one
who is injured at a railroad crossing; that is, that
he stopped, looked, and listened before attempting
to cross. Baltimore & Potomac R. R. v. Landrigan, 191 U. S. 461, 472, 2-l- Sup. Ct. 137, 48 L. Ed.
262; P., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Scherer, 205
Fed. 356, decided by this court l\Iay 6, 1913;
Gates v. Beebe, 170 Mich. 107, 112, 135 N. W.
934. The principle so alluded to is applicable
under other and varying circumstances, where
there is an absence, as here, of direct testimony
on the subject in dispute. Prince v. Lowell Electric Light Corp., 201 Mass. 276, 281, 87 N. E. 558;
Brown v. Coal Co., 143 Iowa, 662, 673, 120 N. W.
732, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1260; Gilbert v. Ann
Arbor R. Co., 161 Mich. 73, 79, 125 N. W. 745. It
follows that the motion to direct was rightly overruled.''
Also, in the case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Oo. v.
Wetherington (Ala.), 16 So. 2d 720, the court made use
of the presumption in a case where the causes of the
accident were either the violation of the Boiler Inspection Act or the negligence of the deceased for whose
death the action was brought under the F.E.L.A. This
presumption was relied on to eliminate the negligence
of the deceased, thereby justifying a finding that it was
caused by the negligence of the company.
The same situation exists in the case at bar. Either
the brake was defective and would not stop the cars, or
Thomas negligently failed to operate the brake. Thomas'
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negligence is eliminated by the presumption, leaving the
defective brake as the cause of his death.
.Also, in the case of Te'YI!YIIant v. P,BoriJa & Pekin Union
R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520, the court
also considered this presumption in determining the
question of proximate cause. The court, after detailing
certain other evidence, stated:
''To this evidence must be added the presumption that the deceased was actually engaged
in the performance of those duties and exercised
due care for his own safety at the time of his
death.''
POINT III.
THERE W .A'S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
JUSTIFY SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE
ISSUES OF THE INSECURITY OF THE CO.AL BIN
.AND THE DANGEROUS. .AND H.AZ.ARDOUS SITUATION EXISTING .AS .A RESULT OF SUCH INSECURITY.
The grounds of negligence numbered (c) and (d)
in the trial court's Instruction No. 1, which acts of negligence are set forth at R. 67, are based fundamentally
upon the failure of the defendant to furnish to decedent
a reasonably safe place to work. When the cars were
dropped southward along the bin track for the purpose
of spotting them upon the bin it was absolutely necessary that the person operating the car maintain the
momentum of the cars. up to the very point at which
thebycars
wereLawtoLibrary.
be stopped
(R. 188).
He
could
notandstop
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the cars on the bin track and then expect any momentum
to be obtained to get them onto the bin. It would have
been necessary for the engine to come down along the
bin track and to push these cars over onto the bin if the
momentum were arrested at any point north of the
exact spot where the cars could be unloaded on the bin.
Hence, a situation existed \vhere it could be anticipated
that the momentum could not be arrested at the proper
point and that some device should have been placed at
the end of the bin which could have properly stopped the
southward mom en tum of the cars.
The only thing that the defendant provided for such
a contingency was merely a raised platform on top of
which the tracks were run, thereby affording a slightly
inclined plane up which the cars must run. When these
cars went on to this raised platform and rails the platform gave way underneath the weight of the car.
Mr. Barnes testified that as the cars were moving
along the bin they were slowing down all the time, and
were moving at a slow rate of speed. He saw them
'' * * * hit the incline. They were moving very slowly
then, because the end of the car raised up very slowly''
(R. 169). He further testified (R. 170): "* * * And it
seemed that this incline broke away from under them,
and they pitched right off of the bin onto the ground.''
From this testimony it appears that this incline
which extended out over the end of the bin, as indicated
by Exhibit ''A'' and which was not supported as solidly
as the balance of the rails on the bin, gave way and thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by permitted the cars to fall thirty-four feet to the
ground below, resulting in the death of Thomas.
We submit that the jury could well find that this
purported bumper device was insufficient and created a
hazardous condition. The rails could have been placed
on an incline in such a manner that the incline would
have been supported as sturdily and securely as the rails
were supported to the north of the incline and which
were upon the bin itself, or some kind of a device could
have been placed on the end of the rails to stop the cars.
Bo~ston & M. R. R. v. M e,ech, 156 F. 2d 109 ( C.C.A.
1), (Certiorari denied 329 U.S.. 763, 67 S. Ct.-124), supports the contention of plaintiff upon the proposition
here asserted. That case was an action for death under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The second count
of the complaint alleged that the decedent's death was
caused by the defendant's failure to provide him with
a reasonably safe place in which to work.
The Court stated (at p. 111 of the Federal Reporter):

''The sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict on the second count is at least equally clear. The defendant might have painted lines
on the platforms of its washstand to indicate the
extent to which locomotives overhang them, and
thus to warn persons on the platforms of ilie
danger incident to standing near their inner
borders, or it might even have set the platforms
of its washstand back from the tracks far enough
to prevent locomotives from overhanging them
all.Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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•'From the foregoing, it is c.Iear that although
some precautions were taken for the decedent's
safety, further precautions were possible, and
from this it follows, as we read the decisions cited
above, that there was an 'evidentiary basis' for
submitting the issue of the defendant's causal
negligence to the jury, and hence that our 'function is exhausted.' Lavender v. Kurn et al, supra
( 66 S. Ct. 744.)."
POINT IV.
THE IXSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT WERE
NOT REPETITIOUS, DID NOT UNDULY EMPHASIZE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE CASE AND
WERE NOT UNBALANCED TO THE PREJUDICE
OF THE DEFENDANT.
The defendant's objections to the instructions of the
trial court are only that they are repetitious, gave undue
emphasis to plaintiff's case and were unbalanced as a
whole. There is no contention under Point III of defendant's brief that the instructions did not contain a
correct statement of the law applicable to a violation of
the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The defendant does
not specifically assert that error was committed in Instruction No. 1, wherein the trial court defined and submitted the issues as drawn by the pleadings in this case.
In stating the issues in that instruction the court properly set forth the grounds upon which plaintiff asserted
in its pleadings that the defendant was negligent. The
trial court set forth the four specific allegations of neglegence as contained in plaintiff's complaint.
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By its Instruction No. 2, the trial court defined the
burden of proof and specifically stated that the burden
was upon the plaintiff to prove by preponderance of the
evidence that the death of Thomas was caused by the
negligent acts of the defendant alleged in the complaint.
The court also stated that this burden of proof was upon
plaintiff to prove the violation of the Safety Appliance
Act before there could be a recovery by plaintiff. In that
instruction it was also stated that if the jury found that
the weight of the evidence was in favor of the defendaln.t
or was equally balanced defendant was entitled to averdict of No Cause of Action. This instruction was one
favoring the defendant in the sense that it was an instruction to the jury that the burden of proof was upon
plaintiff and particularly called to the jury's attention
the fact that this burden was upon the plaintiff in so far
as any violation of the Safety Appliance Act was involved. We are unable to see how the emphasis· of this
burden of proof upon plaintiff could in anty way prejudice the defendant in this case.
In Instruction No. 4, the trial court set forth the
applicable provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability
Act and the Federal Safety Appliance Act. To merely
set forth the provisions of these statutes, and particularly the Safety Appliance Act, would mean nothing to a
jury and would not inform them of the law applicable
to said statutes. To have only told the jury in the wording of paragraph 4 of Instruction 4 of the provisions of
the Federal Safety Appliance Act would not have inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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formed the jury of th~ meaning of that sta:tute
strued by the courts. Certainly it was proper
court to have set forth the exact provisions of
plicable Safety Appliance Act and then to later
the meaning of that statute.

as oonfor the
the ap~
explain

Paragraph 5 of Instruction No. 4 quoted the provision of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, which
provided that where there was a violation of a statute
enacted for the safety of employees no employee killed as
a result of such violation could be held guilty of contributory negligence. This statute was applicable to the
case and its quotation to the jury was not improper.
By paragraph 6 of Instruction No. 4, the trial court
instructed the jury that the defendant was subject to
the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act.
Plaintiff was entitled to have the jury instructed
that the statutes set forth in the instruction were applicable to the defendant and to the issues of the case being
tried.
By the seventh paragraph of Instruction No. 4, the
jury was instructed concerning the duty which was imposed upon the defendant by this statute. Defendant
does not contend that there was any error in the statement of that duty. The duty imposed by this statute is
the duty set forth by the court in the seventh paragraph
of Instruction No. 4. That duty is an absolute, continuing
and unqualified duty, and the failure to discharge that
duty is not excused by any type of care, either reasonable
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or utmost. Hence, by this paragraph of the instruction the
jury was informed of this duty and its extent. There is
no repetition in this statement and the jury is not told
in two or three different ways of the extent of this duty.
By the eighth paragraph of Instruction No. 4 the
jury was instructed that if the defendant hauled or permitted to be hauled or used a car upon which the hand
brakes were inefficient in violation of the absolute duty
so defined, then plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. This
is a correct statement of the law and properly makes
application of the Safety Appliance Act as quoted and as
defined in the previous part of Instruction No. 4.
Paragraph 9 of Instruction No. 4 sets forth the evidence which the jury could consider in determining
whether or not there was a violation of the Act. It may
be that a jury would believe that some actual defect in
the mechanism of the brake would be a necessary item of
proof by plaintiff. However, the rule in Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 1334, does not require that
type of evidence. Certainly it was proper for the jury
to be told that they could consider the evidence of failure
to function in actual operation as evidence of an inefficient brake. Defendant does not assert that this is an
incorrect statement of one of the methods by which inefficiency may be proven.
By the tenth paragraph of Instruction No. 4 the
jury was told that if they should find that there was a
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, as theretofore defined in Instruction No. 4, that the jury should then disreSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gard and not consider plaintiff's conduct which they may
or may not believe to have constituted negligence. Here
again, the court was making application to this case of
statutes theretofore quoted and the jury was informed
of the rule that an employee killed as a result of the violation of. the Safety Appliance Act could not be held
guilty of contributory negligence. Defendant's answer
did not specify any particular act as constituting contributory negligence and this instruction was, therefore,
necessary.
By paragraph eleven of Instruction No. 4, the jury
was told that the Safety Appliance Act was a statute
enacted for the safety of employees and this instruction was certainly proper when considered with paragraph 5 of Instruction No. 4, which eliminated contributory negligence where there was a vio'la tion of the
statute ''enacted for the safety of employees.''
By Instruction No.5, the trial court made applicable
to the case at bar the statement of the duty imposed by
the statute as set forth in paragraph 7 of Instruction
No. 4. By that instruction the jury was specifically instructed that this defendant by the exercise of reasonable or the utmost care could not escape liability for a
violation of the Safety Appliance Act.
By Instruction No. 6, and particularly the first
paragraph thereof, the trial court eliminated from the
case the issue of interstate commerce by determining as
a matter of law that both Thomas and the defendant
were
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ant did not even except to this portion of Instruction No.

6.
The second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 constituted a specific application of the rule set forth in Paragraph 10 of Instruction No. 4 to the evidence and contentions made by defendant concerning alleged contributory negligence. It is to be noted that by this instruction the court informed the jury that if there was a violation of Section 11 of the Safety Appliance Act, which
contributed in whole or in part to Thomas' death, then
they should disregard the evidence offered and received
pertaining to the decedent's conduct in the discharge of
his duties in slowing down the movement and bringing
said car to a stop. This related to the specific testimony
relied upon by defendant as evidence of negligence by
the decedent Thomas. It may be that the tenth paragraph of Instruction No. 4 should have been made to
include this reference to specific acts but it is to be
noted that said paragraph 10 was merely a statement of
the rule called for by defendant's Answer and not an
application of the rule to the evidence in this case.
The law relating to a violation of the Safety Appliance Act cannot be told in two or three sentences and
within the confines of one instruction. The law relating to the Safety Appliance Act requires some explanation to the jury. The court, in explaining this law to the
jury, saw fit to first generally state the provisions of the.
statute and the duty imposed by that statute. After so
defining the law, the court then pointed out the manner
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in which these rules were applicable to the case at bar.
\Ye submit that this n1ethod of explaining does not constitute reversible or prejudicial error. We submit that
the trial court was not in error in following the procedure
as here outlined, especially in view of the fact that defendant does not contend that any error was committed
in the statement of law as set forth in the instructions
other than the very vague insinuation that these rules
were "loosely" stated.
Defendant contends that the trial court was not
fair because all of plaintiff's requested instructions were
granted and only some of defendant's instructions were
granted. Perhaps the correctness of the requests presented had something to do with this. Defendant fails to
point out how this can be or was either error or prejudicial error.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS:. 7 AND 8.
Defendant complains of Instructions Nos. 7 and 8
upon two grounds: (1) that they give to the jury a roving
commission to find the defendant guilty of any and all
negligence which may occur to them; and (2) that these
instructions are mere statements of abstract principles
of law outside of the issues and the evidence.
Instruction No. 7 was necessary by reason of testimony introduced without objection by plaintiff. The
witness Barnes testified that there was no one particular
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method followed in taking loads from the load track and
spotting them on the bin. He stated that there were two
ways which were followed. One method was to couple
the engine to the cars and push them out. The other
method was to permit the cars to drop along the bin track
pulled by gravity and to stop them by the use of hand
brakes at the desired spot (R. 145, 146). These were
the only two methods about which there was any evidence. As indicated in the brief of appellant, evidence
was adduced by both parties regarding these respective
methods.
As a phase of the negligence in using and adopting
the method of dropping the cars the plaintiff's contention developed from the foregoing testimony that the
defendant had a duty to adopt and prescribe a reasonably safe method of performing such work and in view of
the fact that they have not done so, they were negligent in not prescribing that the cars should be spotted on
the bin by pushing them to the spot desired by means
of the engine with its obviously greater control of the
cars. In view of the evidence introduced the jury certainly could not be mislead by this instruction in imagining other and different ways by whch the cars could be
placed on the bin. Defendant states that the jury was
not limited to the one particular alleged unsafe method
prescribed and set forth in the complaint. We are unable
to imagine any other methods than the two above described by which cars could be spotted upon the bin.
Plaintiff at all times during the trial contended that the
dropping of the cars and spotting them was an unsafe
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method and that the pushing of the cars under the control of the engine to the bin was a safe method of accomplishing this work. No other contention could have
been made under the evidence, under the pleadings, nor
under the instructions. The jury was of necessity limited
to a consideration of these two methods.
"\Ye submit that under the facts and circumstances of
this case there could be no roving commission given to
the jury by this instruction to find any other unsafe
method than the one adopted by Station Agent Brown
and Conductor Barnes in accomplishing the task at hand.
This same complaint is made of Instruction No. 8.
This instruction is one which is given in every case where
it is sought to establish liability against the master by
reason of the negligence of his servants or employees.
By this instruction the jury was instructed that the defendant was responsible for the negligence of its employees while acting within the course of their employment. There is no statement in this instruction that if
the jury find an employee negligent, then plaintiff is
entitled to recover.
The cases cited by defendant in its brief are cases
where the instruction informed the jury that they were
to find for the plaintiff if an employee of the defendant
was negligent. We are not here concerned with such an
instruction.
For instance, in Herring v. Chicago & A. R. Co.,
299 TIL 214, 132 N. E. 792, the instruction held erroneous
ends with the words ''then the jury will find the defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ant guilty.'' The questioned instruction contains no
such words. Instruction No.2 (R. 69) limits recovery to
the grounds alleged.
The trial court by said Instruction No. 2 instructed
the jury that plaintiff could recover only in the event
that the negligence as set forth in the complaint was
found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence. Hence,
the trial court limited the jury to a consideration of the
issues as presented by the pleadings and the evidence.
Only in the event that the jury found such negligence
could a verdict be returned in favor of plaintiff. It,
therefore, follows that the only negligence of employees
which could be imputed to the defendant and establish
liability must have been such negligence as would come
within the issues defined by the court.
We submit that neither Instruction No. 7 nor 8 gave
the jury a roving commission to find for plaintiff on
any or all grounds of negligence which the jury might
be able to allege.
The defendant's second criticism of these instructions is that they are mere statements of abstract principles of law.
Instruction No.7, as above pointed out, is based upon
specific evidence introduced at the trial of this case,
wherein it appeared that the defendant had failed to
prescribe a safe method to accomplish the task of spotting cars on the coal bin, that is, the defendant had failed
to require that cars be pushed by the engine to the bin.
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When considered in the light of this evidence this instruction cannot possibly be said to be an abstract statement of the law. This definitely was related to the issue raised by the allegation contained in paragraph 8(a)
of plaintiff's complaint (R. 4).
Instruction No. 8 informed the jury of the we'llestablished rule of law that an employer is civilly liable
for the negligence of his employee performed within the
scope of his employment and that in the present case
the negligence of defendant's employees would be imputable to the defendant if such negligence was within
the scope of the employee's employment. This is not
an abstract principle of law which has no application
to the issues in the case at bar. This is an instruction to
which plaintiff was entitled and the jury should have
been instructed relative to this rule of law. The defendant corporation in this case could not act except through
employees. It then became necessary to inform the jury
that the negligence of employees could be imputed -to
the defendant. Liability could not be predicated upon
negligence which did not come within Instruction No. 2.
We submit that both instructions No'S. 7 and 8 were
statements of principles of law, having direct application
to the facts of this case and to the eviidence and the issues tried in the trial court.
POINT VI.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE ESTABLISHED AS MATTER OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S
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DECEDENT THOMAS WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE ANY ERRORS REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS RELATING
TO LIABILITY DO NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL OR REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In the first four points in defendant's brief and
which have heretofore been answered by plaintiff, the
defendant contends that errors were made on instructions relating to the question of liability. As held in the
case of Bruner" v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 2d
649, where the negligence of the defendant is established
as a matter of law any errors in the court's instruction
regarding liability do not constitute reversible or prejudicial error_.
The defendant does not claim in its brief that the
evidence was insufficient to support the finding of liability made by the jury. ·This is understandable when one
considers the conclusive character of the evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant in having Thomas
drop and spot cars on the coal bin. While there were general statements by the Witness Barnes that this operation
of dropping and spotting cars was not unusual, it should
be noted that he stated that he had never seen cars
dropped and spotted upon the coal bin by any person
other than a brakeman by the name of Burke (R. 188).
Burke had been on this job for four or five years (R.
186, 187). Barnes was not accustomed to doing the work
in this manner (R. 184). In fact, he had told both
Thomas and Brakeman Schauster that they would not
drop any cars to the bin, Barnes knowing that neither
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Thomas nor Schauster had ever dropped and spotted
cars on the coal bin. Barnes on each occasion had used
the engine to spot the cars on the bin (R. 192). It is
obvious why this method would be used in preference to
the dropping by gravity and spotting of the cars on the
bin. In accomplishing the task with the engine it was
necessary that six or eight cars be used in the operation. This was required because the engine could not
go onto the trestle or the bin because of its weight. When
the operation was performed with the engine all of the
air brakes ·would be placed in operation under all of the
six or eight cars used in the movement (R. 247-8-9). By
this means the operation would be made with the control
of the engine with its independent brake and with the
air brakes under the car. This establishes that it would
be much easier and safer to spot the cars in this manner.
Barnes, who was in charge of the ground crew (R. 143)
had determined to spot these two cars upon the bin
by shoving them out under the control of the engine
(R. 166). However, in getting these cars into position to
take them out on the bin track, the engine had been derailed (R. 162). The defendant's station agent, Brown,
when he discovered this situation, talked with Barnes
and concerning this conversation Barnes stated (R. 165):

'' Q. Did he give you any directions~
* **
A.

Yes, the first thing he said was that the ovens
were out of coal, and they were going to have
to close the ovens down if we didn't get some
coal
onto the bin right away, and he asked
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me if I would drop two cars onto the bin,
so they might charge the ovens immedia;tely. ''
As indicated, Barnes had determined that he would
shove the cars out with the engine. When asked whether
he had a reason for having determined to accomplish
the operation by shoving, he stated (R. 167):
''A. Yes, there was a reason. I knew these boys
(Thomas and Schauster) had never taken
cars to spot out there, without the engine, so
that was my way of doing it, taking them out
with the engine."
Thomas had only been on this job for six days and
Schauster had been on it ~ve days ·(R. 186). Hence,
Barnes directed these brakemen, who had never had any
experience in this operation, to undertake the dropping
and spotting of the cars on the bin. In this method of
operation the only control that was had over the cars
was the hand brake on the lead car. It was necessary
that the momentum of this car be maintained until it
was upon the bin.
We submit that this evidence of the requiring of
Thomas to drop and spot the cars when he had had
absolutely no experience and when Barnes had himself,
because of this inexperience, determined to control the
spotting of the cars by the engine and the air brakes on
the cars established negligence as a matter of law. This
method was chosen as a result of the desire not to permit the coke ovens to cool down. It was based upon a
desire for haste and was made without .regard to the
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safety of Thomas and in the very face of the fact that
Barnes had not wanted to perform the operation in this
particular manner.
Concerning the conduct of the deceased there is a
presumption that he used due care for his own safety.
16 Am. Jur. 207; 35 Am. Jur. 913; St.ate v. Busby, 102
Utah 416, 131 P. 2d 510; TeriJYI)OJnt v. Pe~oria & Pekim
Union R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed 520•.
There is in the record absolutely no evidence to overcome this presumption of due care and hence requires
a finding as matter of law that the deceased was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
Under the authority of the Bruner case, supra, evidence supporting liability as a matter of law eliminates
any error which may have been committed by the trial
court on the subject of liability.
POINT VII.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROPERLY RAISED
THE OBJECTION IT NOW ASSERTS TO THE
TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS
MATTER OF LAW ON THE QUESTION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
After the defendant entered into the stipulation,
found at Record 350, it was assumed by all persons connected with the trial of the case that the defendant had
stipulated the question of Interstate Commerce and had
agreed that plaintiff's remedy was properly pursued
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. ment is true unless defendant had a secret intent at the
time, undisclosed to anyone, that it intended to stipulate on this matter but to so word the stipulation that it
would not be effective. We call the Court's attention to
the carefully worded motion for a directed verdict (R.
30, 81), in which defendant at no time questioned the
sufficiency of the evidence on the issue of interstate
commerce. If they seek to rely upon the insufficiency
of evidence in any particular, it is well established that
they should call it to the Court's attention. See Smalley
v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 34 Utah 423, 98 P. 311;
Grahi(]Jm v. Ogd·en Union Ry. & DepO't Co., 79 Utah 1, 6
P. 2d 465. The reason for this is obvious and well stated
in the foregoing cases. A party should call to the attention of the trial court and to opposing counsel any deficiencies it claims in the evidence in order that counsel
for the other side may, if he has other evidence on the
subject, introduce such evidence at the trial of the case
and thereby do away with the necessity of an entire retrial of the case because of a deficiency in the evidence
which could have been cured at the first trial.
It is to be noted that the defendant did not by its
instructions request that the issue of interstate commerce
be submitted to the jury and that defendant did not take
exception to the instruction in which the court stated
directly that it had determined as matter of law that
defendant and decedent were mutually engaged in interstate commerce, and that any cause of action which
plaintiff may have to recover damages arises out of and
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is controlled by the Federal statutes, theretofore referred
to in the instructions.
The defendant, in making its exceptions, only excepted to the second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 ( R.
359).

The defendant relies upon an exception taken to
paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Instruction No. 4. Those paragraphs of Instruction No. 4 merely set forth the statutory provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Defendant's contention here seems to be that the question of interstate commerce should have been submitted
to the jury to be determined by them as a question of
fact. If this had been done it still would have been
necessary and proper to give paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of
Instruction No.4 in order that if the jury did find interstate commerce they would be properly advised of the
law as laid down in the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. There is no statement in the paragraphs indicated
in Instruction No. 4 which expressly states that the
court has determined the question of interstate commerce as a matter of law. The jury was advised of that
determination by the first paragraph of Instruction No.
6 and there is no exception taken to that instruction and
determination by the court.
It is submitted that defendant did not at any time
in the trial court properly call to the attention of the
trial court or to counsel for the plaintiff that it contended that the issue of interstate commerce should be
one submitted to the jury for its determination, or that
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the evidence on that subject was in any way deficient.
Hence, defendant's present contention comes too late
and was not properly raised in the trial court.
POINT VIII.
DEFENDANT HAS NO RIGHT TO SET OFF
ANNUITIES PAYABLE UNDER THE RAILROAD
RETIREMENT ACT.
Defendant contends that it is entitled to a setoff for
sums contributed by defendant under the Federal Carriers Taxing Act ( 45 U.S.C.A., Sections 261-273 inc.) and
payable to the widow and children under the provisions
of the Railroad Retirement Act (45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 228e,
pocket supplement).
Defendant cites no case to support its contention but
does cite cases holding that there can be no setoff, which
cases were cited to the trial court by plaintiff and upon
which the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to strike
this setoff.
Defendant relies upon the wording of Section 55 of
45 U.S.C.A. That section states that:

'' * * * such common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit or indemnity that may have
been paid to * * * the person entitled thereto on
account of the * * * death for which said action
was brought."
An examination of defendant's setoff (R. 16, 17)
shows that it does not come within the literal words of
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this section, even construed without regard to authority
or other sections of the Act.
In the first place, we submit that an annuity paid
under the Railroad Retirement Act is neither insurance,
a relief benefit, nor an indemnity.
Next, the only allowance which can be made is such
sum or sums as have been paid by the defendant to any
insurance, etc., "that may have been paid to plaintiff."
Defendant seeks to set off here not sums which have
been paid to plaintiff but seeks to recover the present
value of sums to be paid to the plaintiff in the future.
The foregoing quoted section of the Federal Employers' Liability Act does not contemplate the setoff
of annuities to be paid in the future. Only such sums
as have been actually paid to plaintiffs are mentioned.
Defendant does not in this action seek to recover sums
\ '
which have been paid. It seeks to recover sums which
are payable in the future. So far as the allegations are
concerned it states that the widow and children of the
deceased are receiving or are entitled to receive. There
is no allegation that these dependants of the deceased
have received any money as a result of any annuity and
payments.
Section 58 of 45 U.S.C.A. provides as follows:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be held to
limit the duty or liability of common carriers or
to impair the rights of their employees under any
other Act or Acts of Congress.''

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

48
As stated in the brief of appellant, at page 64, the
Hetrick and the Peeler cases state that this is an obstacle
to a setoff under the provisions of Section 55 of Title 45
U.S.C.A. It is submitted that this section does prevent
any such setoff for the practical reason that if a person
must deduct what they receive under other Acts from
a judgment for wrongful death or injury, certainly their
rights under the other Act have been limited or impaired
because they are not entitled to receive the money under
the other Acts but such moneys are to be paid by virtue
of the judgment obtained under the Federal Employers'
Liahili ty Act.
As pointed out in Chicago Great West·ern Ry. Oo. v.
Beeler, 140 F. 2d 865 (C.C.A. 8), an employercannot set
up in mitigation of damages in a tort action by an in-·
jured employee indemnity from a collateral source, such
as insurance or compensation, or benefits under Workmen 's Compensation Act, even where the defendant has
contributed to the fund.
In the case of Hetrick v. RBading Co., 39 F. Supp. 22,
25, the Court states :
''The four corners of the Retirement Act
and particularly the provisions hereinabove
quoted disclose that the right to an annuity by
an em·ployee is preserved intact. Eligibility to the
annuity based upon disability and service is not
contingent upon the employee's lack of fault, and
specifically, the annuity is made impervious to
the claims of creditors. Furthermore, anticipation
of the fund is precluded. These provisions indi-
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cate that the fund is the inherent right of the
employee which becomes crystallized upon the
occurrence of the designated prerequisites.
'• The terms of the Employers' Liability Act
as quoted hereinabove are not inconsistent with
the inalienableness of an annuity under the Retirement Act. It is expressly provided that nothing in that Act 'shall be. held * * * to impair the
rights of * * * employees under any other Act or
Acts of Congress'.''
We submit that on both reason and authority the
defendant is not entitled to a setoff for payments which
were to be made under the Railroad Retirement Act.
POINT IX.
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE AND THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO ORDER A REDUCTION IN THE
AMOUNT OR A NEW TRIAL.
Plaintiff was awarded a verdict of $50,000.00 for
the benefit of the widow and two minor children of the
deceased. This award was made by a jury of eight individuals. No exception was taken to the jury or any
member thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury
evincing passion or prejudice is called to the attention
of this court by defendant. A motion for a new trial
was made and argued. One of the grounds of this motion
was that the verdict should be cut or a new trial awarded
because of its excessiveness. The trial court denied this
motion and thereby placed its stamp of approval upon
the verdict so rendered.
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As was stated in Stephens Ramch & Live Stock Co.
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 45 at 462:

'' * * * Necessarily upon such a question appellate courts must, to a large extent, rely upon
the judgment and discretion of the trial court.
That court is in a much better position to observe
and determine whether a jury was actuated by
passion or prejudice, or by both, in returning a
verdict for an amount larger than the evidence
justifies or whether the jury was merely mistaken with regard to the amount that should have
been allowed. ''
The most recent discussion of the rules pertaining to
an exc;essive verdict is contained in the case of P,auly
v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 436, 184 P. 2d 123. That was
a personal injury case a!lid the case at bar is a deathl
case. However, it is submitted that the rules relating to
excessive verdicts are the same in both types of cases.
The jury is given a large discretion in fixing the amount
of damages in death cases. The rule is stated in 25
C.J.S. 1265, Death, Section 115, as follows:
''The jury is vested with a large discretion
in fixing the ·amount of damages, and to justify
interference by the court it must appear that some
rule of law has been violated or that the verdict
was the result of partiality, passion, or prejudice.
''While, as has already been shown, the general rule is that the recovery is confined to strictly pecuniary damages, the jury ·are not bound by
any fixed and precise rules in estimating the
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mum and minimum limits may be fixed by statute,
but are Yested with a large discretion in fixing
the amount. There is necessarily difficulty in
fixing a pecuniary value upon human life; the
amount of compensation to be recovered must
depend to quite an extent upon the good judgment
of the jury under proper instructions from the
court. Even where the statutes prescribe a maximum and minimum amount of recovery, the
amount to be awarded within the prescribed limits
is within the discretion of the jury. To justify interference by the court with the verdict of the
jury it must appear that some rule of law has
been violated, or else that the verdict is so excessive or grossly inadequate as to indicate partiality, passion, or prejudice in the minds of the
jury.''
In the Pauly case this court stated:
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion or
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a
motion for new trial, we may order the verdict
set aside, and a new trial granted. Jensen v.
D. & R. G. Ry. Co., supra; and other cases cited
above following that decision. But mere excessiveness of a verdict, without more, does not
necessarily show that the verdict was arrived at
by passion or prejudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock v. U. P. Ry. Co., supra. It is true that the
verdict might be so grossly excessive and disapproportionate to the injury that we could say from
that fact alone that as a matter of law the verdict
must have been arrived at by passion or prejudice.
factsFunding
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determined as a matter of law, or the verdict
must be so excessive as to be shocking to one's
conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury. MeAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra;
Ward v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., supra. This is
not such a case.
"The verdict here was admittedly liberal.
But the mere fact that it was more than another
jury, or more than this court might have given, or
even more than the evidence justified, does not
conclusively show that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the
jury.* * *.
''The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v.
So. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The present cost of living and the diminished purchasing
power of the dollar may be taken into consideration when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby,
57 Utah 53, 192 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union
Ry. & Depot Co., supra.
''We can discover nothing in this case, except the amount of the verdict, which indicates
passion or prejudice, and, as we have seen, passion and prejudice are not necessarily inferred
from an excessive verdict, without more. No exception was taken to the jury or any member
thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury,
evincing passion and prejudice has been called
to our attention. The only point of complaint is
the size of verdict.''
We submit that there is nothing about the verdict in
this
case which should cause this court either to reduce
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the verdict or to grant a new trial. A verdict of $50,000.00 in a case where the person killed was thirty-six
years of age certainly cannot be said to shock one's conscience or to indicate passion, prejudice or corruption
on the part of a jury. The evidence in this case supports
this v-erdict and we believe would support a verdict in a
larger amount.
The trial court instructed the jury in the case at bar
that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory damages for the p€cuniary loss sustained by the widow and
two minor children. The jury was instructed that such
damages consisted of two elements: (1) The present
value of the contributions which the widow and minor
children could reasonably have expected from the deceased during his lifetime had he lived (R. 84, 86), and
(2) the pecuniary value of the loss of care, attention, instruction, training, advice and guidan0e suffered by the
minor children of the deceased as a result of his death
(R. 87).
The defendant in its brief arrives at the conclusion
that the widow and children could not expect mor·e than
$100.00 per month from the deceased. The reasoning
by which this result is reached cannot be sustained by
any principle known to the law.
On her direct examination the widow testified:

'' Q. About how much do you think was spent on
an average each month to pay for the household expenses and to pay the doctor and denandFunding
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and for the food and clothing of yourself and
children, and all those expenses, about how
much a month~
''A. Oh, $250.00 to $275.00 a month.'' (R. 270).
Defendant maintains in its brief that this answer was
forced or pressed out of the witness. The record does
not support this claim. True it is that she testified that
deceased made between $250.00 and $275.00 per month,
but it is apparent 'from reading the record that the witness misunderstood the question, because, when asked
if that was what the deceased brought home, she replied:
''No, he would bring the whole thing home'' and then
went on to testify his total average earnings while working for the railroad would amount to from $300.00 to
$350.00 per month (R. 269).
Defendant's counsel, on cross examination, asked the
widow if certain figures he quoted to her were not the
amount of earnings paid to the deceased by the railroad
and she testified she imagined these figures were about
right~ (R. 278, 279). However, it appears without conflict that the deceased worked not only for the railroad
but also worked for contractors on road grading and
house construction (R. 282). Defendant concludes that
because the deceased received $51.80 in May from the
railroad that such sum is a:ll that he earned during that
month. Such conclusion is not warranted by the ·evidence.
He could have earned from others and his widow's
testimony that he earned from $300.00 to $350.00 per
month will justify the conclusion that he did work for
others to supplement his railroad income.
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Defendant also eliminates any income during the
months of January and February and assumes that deceased worked on his house during these two months.
This conclusion is not justified by the widow's testimony. She stated that when he was not working for
anyone for money he was engaged in painting and repairing their home. She testified regarding the time spent doing this work as follows:
"Oh, all together I expect it would be-in '47,
let's see, all together I expect it would be two
months." (R. 283).
Certainly this work and labor of the deceased constituted a contribution to his family and should not be
written off and be excluded in arriving at the pecuniary
loss suffered by his family as a result of his death.
It is unreasonable to believe that a working man
would be able to spend two full months in succession
without any income and still be able to keep his family
from starving to death. The reasonable inference to he
drawn from this testimony is that at times during the
year 1947, totalling about two months, he spent painting and repairing his home and that such work was done
when he was not working for either the railroad or for
contractors.

At the time of his death deceased was making from
$18.00 to $20.00 per day (R. 261).
We submit that the evidence taken as a whole would
reasonably justify a finding that decedent's earning
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capacity amounted to $300.00 a month and that a conclusion that $200.00 a month could be reasonably expected as contributions by his family would be well within the evidence introduced in this case. That figure alone
would justify and support the entire verdict in this case.
$200.00 per month for the expectancy of deceased, discounted at two and three-fourths percent interest
amounts to $50,113.19. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit "T").
Even if we eliminate the two months of the nine in
the year 1947 for work on the house, we have an average
of $233.00 per month. (Seven times $300.00 equals $2,100.00 divided by nine equals $233.00). Subtract from
this the $65.00 a month board and lodging away from
home and we have $168.00 for contributions to his family. Using Plaintiff's Exhibit "T" and a rate of two and
three-fourths percent discount, we find that the present
value of such contributions amounts to $39,589.46, leaving a balance of $10,410.54 to be accounted for in the
loss of care, attention, instruction, training, etc.
We submit that $10,000.00 to $11,000.00 for loss of
this latter element of damages does not indicate passion
or prejudice and is authorized by the evidence in the
record concerning the disposition of the deceased toward
his wife and children. (See R. 265, 271, 272).
This element of damage has been recognized as recoverable in cases under the Fedenal EmpZoyers' Liability Act; Michiga;n C. R. Co. v. Vree~and, 227 U.S. 59,
33 S. Ct. 192, 57 L. Ed. 417, Annotated Cases 1914 (c)
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176; Norfolk & Western Ry. Co'. v. Htolbif10iok, 235 U.S.
625, 35 S. Ct. 1±3, 59 L. Ed. 392.
We submit that the verdict rendered in this case is
not one which should be interfered with by this court and
there is absolutely no showing either by the amount or
otherwise that the jury was influenced by passion, prejudice or corruption.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the defendant in
this case had a fair and impartial trial by a jury of
citizens of Salt Lake County, that the verdict both as
to liability and damages was supported and sustained
by the evidence adduced by the parties; no pre judicial
error resulted from any of the instructions or rulings of
the trial court and no error was committed in the denial
of defendant's motion for a new trial. The judgment of
the trial court should, therefore, be affirmed.
1

Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE & BLACK,
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS,
WAYNE L.. BLACK,
Att~orneys

for Respondenft.
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